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NOTES
Wisconsin Income Taxation-Husband and Wife Partnership :1
A family partnership has always been a popular means of reducing
the total income tax liability imposed on a sole proprietor and his family.
Rather than have the total income of the business taxed entirely to him-
self, he will often endeavor to divert a portion of the business income
to other members of the family, who would be taxed at lower rates.
Attempting to accomplish this by making the family members employees
of the business is of limited effectiveness since business deductions for
wage and salary payments are allowed only if they are "reasonable" in
relation to services rendered.2 Therefore the owner may try to give
the members an "interest" in the business and thereby effect a greater
diversion of the business income to them because of the business interest.
One way to create and transfer this "interest" is to establish a family
partnership.
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1948, which introduced the "income
splitting" provision for a husband and wife, 3 there was a federal tax
incentive for a sole proprietor to form a partnership with his wife.
The validity of such a partnership was often in issue; and the courts
declared that they would not be duped by a mere allegation but would
require the taxpayers to prove its reality.4 The U.S. Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Towers and in Commissioner v. Culbertson6 made two
major attempts to set forth clear guidelines for the lower courts to
follow when passing on the validity of a family partnership. However
the lower federal courts continued to vary greatly among themselves
as to the requirements and many refused to sustain the partnership if
its formation was tax motivated. As a result of this confusion, Congress
in 1951 adopted what is now section 704(e) of the Internal Revenue
Code in order to sustain a family partnership regardless of how, or from
whom, the alleged partner acquired the interest and regardless of
whether the transfer was motivated by tax reasons. 7 Section 704(e)
does not purport to cover every family partnership; rather it is limited
to the more usual situation in which the family member is alleged to
be a partner because he, or she, owns a capital interest in a business
in which capital is a material income-producing factor. 5
1 This article has been limited to a family partnership involving a husband and
wife. However, much of what is said in this regard will have relevance to
any family partnership situation.
2 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §162(a) (1) ; TREAs. REG. § 1.62(a) (1956).
3 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §2(a), added by 62 STATS. 114 (1948). The split is
accomplished by a joint return with the tax figured on half the combined
taxable income and then multiplied by two. After this provision was adopted,
a husband and wife could obtain the same tax savings by filing a joint return
as they could by forming a partnership.
4 Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 752 (1949).
5 Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 290 (1946).
6 Note 4, supra.
Although the inducement to form a partnership in order to reduce
income taxes may no longer exist for a husband and wife under federal
law,9 such an inducement continues to exist for a husband and wife
subject to Wisconsin income taxes since Wisconsin has not adopted an
"income splitting" provision. When the Wisconsin legislature in 1965
"federalized" its income tax laws so that, in general, Wisconsin income
taxes are now determined under the provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 and subsequent amendments, 10 it did not adopt the federal
"income splitting" provision; and a husband and wife must still report
separately the income that each actually earned." Therefore, if a husband
and wife in Wisconsin wish to obtain the total tax advantages similar to
those resulting from the federal "income splitting" provision, they must
form a partnership.
Since the Internal Revenue Code covers partnerships in general
and has a specific section on family partnerships and since Wisconsin
income taxes will now be determined under the Code, the validity of a
Wisconsin husband and wife partnership, in which capital is a material
income-producing factor, will depend on the Code and specifically on
section 704(e) 2 Federal case law 3 and the Federal Income Tax Regu-
lations will provide valuable guidelines since these supplement and in-
terpret the Code.
7 1951-2 Cum. BULL. 458, 485-486, S. Rep. No. 781, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 737
(1951).
8 If the operation is a personal service business, i.e., one in which capital is
not a material income-producing factor, the wife may not be recognized as
a partner unless she performs vital additional services. But Poggetto v. United
States, 306 F.2d 76, 79 (9th Cir. 1962), intimates that she could still be held
as a partner if the taxpayers in good faith intended to join together as partners
and that the test is still that laid down by Culbertson:
"the question is not whether the services or capital contributed by a
partner are of sufficient importance to meet some objective standard
supposedly established by the Tower case, but whether, considering all
the facts-the agreement, the conduct of the parties in execution of its
provisions, their statements, the testimony of distinterested persons, the
relationship of the parties, their respective abilities and capital contri-
butions, the actual control of income and the purpose for which it is
used, and any other facts throwing light on their true intent-the parties
in good faith and acting with a business purpose intended to join to-
gether in the present conduct of the enterprise."
However the problems in the area of a personal service partnership are be-
yond the scope of this article.
9 Note 3, supra.
10 This was achieved by equating Wisconsin definitional terms with those of the
federal government as set forth in the 1954 Code and subsequent amendments.
Wis. STAT. §71.02(2) (1965).
11 Wisconsin does allow a husband and wife to divide the total amount of item-
ized deductions between themselves as they choose, if they elect to itemize.
Wis. STAT. §71.05(3) (d) (1965). This right applies to itemized deductions
but not to "above the line" deductions taken before arriving at federal ad-justed gross income. Wis. STAT. §71.02(2) (f) (1965).
12 Wisconsin case law on the validity of a family partnership is limited to one
supreme court case, Thomas v. Department of Taxation, 250 Wis. 8, 26
N.W.2d 310 (1947), which relied in part on the Tower decision, and to various
decisions of the State of Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission (formerly
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Consideration of the federal law on family partnerships may be
divided into two main areas. The first is the requirements for a valid
family partnership. Assuming a valid partnership, the second is the
circumstances under which the tax department will reallocate the
partnership income for income tax purposes.
One of the requirements is to qualify under the Code's general
definition of a partnership:
The term 'partnership' includes a syndicate, group, pool,
joint venture, or other unincorporated organization, through or
by means of which any business, financial operation, or venture
is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of this title,
a trust or estate or a corporation;...14
Whenever the term is used in the Internal Revenue Code, the above
definition will control even though under state law a partnership might
be distinguished, for example, from a joint venture.
Assuming that the business is one in which capital is a material
income-producing factor,15 the basic question under section 704(e) is
whether the wife actually owns her capital interest.' 6 Prior to the 1951
amendment, the ultimate inquiry was whether the husband and wife
had a bona fide intent,17 which was often interpreted as requiring non-
tax reasons for forming the partnership. Although Congress was dis-
satisfied with the above approach and enacted section 704(e) to shift
the emphasis to the actual ownership aspect, 8 the Treasury Regulations
known as the Wisconsin Board of Tax Appeals). The more recent decisions
of the Commission do not cite Thomas as authority; and since the majority
of these decisions include only Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it
is impossible to ascertain what standards or tests are being applied. However,
this is now a moot question for any tax years of a family partnership after
the 1965 "federalization."
'3 e.g., Harry S. Reddig, 30 T.C. 1382 (1958); Jack Smith, 32 T.C. 1261 (1959).
14 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 §7701 (a) (2).
is TREAS. REG. §1.704-1 (e) (1) (iv) (1956). "... the determination as to whether
capital is a material income-producing factor must be made by reference to
all the facts of each case. Capital is a material income-producing factor if a
substantial portion of the gross income of the business is attributable to the
employment of capital in the business conducted by the partnership. In general
capital is not a material income-producing factor where the income of the
business consists principally of fees, commissions, or other compensation for
personal services performed by members or employees of the partnership.
On the other hand, capital is ordinarily a material income-producing factor
if the operation of' the business requires substantial inventories or a sub-
stantial investment in plant, machinery, or other equipment."
An example of a business in which capital would not be a material income-
producing factor would exist where the wife owns the office building from
which her husband operates as an insurance agent. The services of the hus-
band represent the material income-producing factor in this business.
1G TREAs. REG. §1.704-1(e)(1)(v) (1956. ". . . a capital interest in a partnership
means an interest in the assets of the partnership, which is distributable to
the owner of the capital interest upon his withdrawal from the partnership
or upon liquidation of the partnership. The mere right to participate in the
earnings and profits of a partnership is not a capital interest in the partner-
ship."
17 Note 4, supra.
is Note 7, supra.
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indicate that tax avoidance or evasion purposes will still have an influ-
ence. on whether the transaction is bona fide.' 9
The elements necessary to prove actual ownership by the wife over
her interest will depend-to a great extent on how she acquired it from
her husband. Section 704(e) (3) provides:
For the purposes of this section, an 'interest purchased by
one member of a family from another shall be considered to be
created by gift from the seller and the fair market value of the
purchased interest shall .be considered to be donated capital.
Although this section, if strictly construed, would treat a purchased in-
terest as one created by gift, the Treasury Regulations20 set forth
separate standards for the two situations and clearly imply2 ' that if the
tests for a purchased interest are met, the wife will be treated as the
actual owner of her interest without being required to meet the tests
for a donated interest.
A purchased interest, whether 'acquired "directly '" -2 2 or by means
of a loan or credit extended by a member of the family, will be recog-
nized as bona fide if either of the following can be shown:
(1) that the transaction has the usual characteristics of an arm's-
length transaction as manifested by all relevant factors, including the
terms of the purchase agreement (as to price, due date of payment, rate
of interest, and security, if any), the terms of any collateral loan or credit
agreement, the credit standing of the purchaser, and capacity of the
purchaser to make a legally binding obligation ;23 or
(2) that the purchase was genuinely intended to promote the busi-
ness either by securing the participation of the purchaser or by adding
his, or her, credit to that of the other participants. 24
If the alleged purchase price has not been paid, or otherwise dis-
charged, the elements of (1) and (2) will be considered only as an
aid in determining whether the transaction was bona fide.25 Failure of
the transaction to meet these requirements will compel the husband and
wife to meet the tests applicable to a transfer of a partnership interest
by gift.
Actual ownership by the wife, as donee of a capital interest in the
partnership, will be determined from all the facts and circumstances,
19 TREAs. REG. §1.704-1(e) (1) (iii) (1956); TREAS. RFG. §1.704-1(e) (2) (x)
(1956).20 TREAs.REG. §1.704(e) (2) & (4) (1956).
21 TREAS. REG. §1.704(e) (4) (i) (1956). "If a purported purchase of a capital
interest in a partnership does not meet the requirements of subdivision (ii)
of this subparagraph, the ownership by the transferee of such capital interest
will be recognized only if it qualifies under the requirements applicable to a
transfer of a partnership interest by gifts."
22 In the context of this section of the Regulations, "directly" seems to refer to
a cash purchase.
23 TREAs. RFG. §1.704-1(e) (4) (ii) (a) (1956).
24 TREAS. REG. §1.704-1(e) (4) (ii) (b) (1956).
25 TREAS. RiG. §1.704-1(e) (4) (ii) (1956).
1967-68] NOTES-
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
not only at the time of the purported transfer but also during the period
preceding and following it.26 One important factor in determining
whether the wife is the actual owner of the donated interest is the
extent to which the donor has retained incidents of ownership over the
donated capital interest. Some of these incidents of ownership are con-
trol over distribution of income or restriction on the distribution (other
than amounts retained to meet the reasonable needs of the business),
control over capital withdrawals, control of assets essential to the busi-
ness, and exercise of management powers inconsistent with normal re-
lationships among partners. 27 Such controls may be legitimately exer-
cised by the husband, as donor, if he acts as a general manager or as
a general partner in a limited partnership. In these circumstances, the
donor exercises the controls in a fiduciary capacity and in no way in-
fringes on the donee's rights of owership. It often will be a question
of degree concerning whether the donor's controls are normal or whether
they are so great as to substantially inhibit the donee's ownership rights.
Other important indicia for determining the donee's real ownership
in the donated capital interest are: (1) substantial participation by the
donee in the control and management of the business (which presup-
-poses a sufficient maturity and experience to deal with business prob-
lems) ;28 (2) actual distribution of income to the donee for his, or her,
sole benefit and use ;29 (3) compliance with local partnership, fictitious
names, and business regulation statutes; (4) control of the business
bank account; (5) existence of a written agreement, records, or memor-
andum on the nature of the partnership agreement and the rights and
liabilities of the partners; (6) filing of partnership tax returns as re-
quired by law; (7) donee being held out to the public as a partner, as
to customers, creditors, and other sources of financing; (8) recognition
by the public of the donee's rights in the distribution of partnership
income and capital;30 and (9) presence or absence of tax avoidance
motive.3 1
Although the above factors are important, compliance or non-
compliance with them does not conclusively establish the existence or
non-existence of actual ownership by the wife over her capital interest.
The Treasury Regulations have followed the spirit of the Culbertson
decision in rejecting any particular objective test as conclusive and
instead require a consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the
particular case.3 2
While the preceding requirements relate to the situation of a transfer
26 TREAs. REG. §1. 704-1(e) (1) (iii) (1956).
27 TREAS. REG. §1.704-1 (e) (2) (ii) (1956).
28 TREAS. REG. §1.704-1 (e) (2) (iv) (1956).
29 TREAS. REG. §1.704-1(e) (2) (v) (1956).
30 TREAS. REG. §1.704-1(e) (2) (vi) (1956).3 1 TREAS. REG. §1.704-1(e) (2) (x) (1956).
3 Note 25, supra.
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from the husband to the wife by purchase or by gift, the Treasury
Regulations do not indicate whether the above requirements would also
apply to a transfer from a third party, by purchase or by gift, to the
wife with a subsequent contribution by the wife toward the formation
of a partnership with the husband. The mere fact that the wife acquired
her interest through a third party would seem to indicate that she is
the actual owner of it and that the subsequent contribution resulted in
a bona fide partnership. However all the facts and circumstances would
still be considered, and the elements set forth in the Treasury Regula-
tions would be important in making the determination.
Although the taxpayers may have succeeded in establishing the
existence of a partnership, the federal tax department may disagree
with the allocation of income between the partners. If the wife's interest
was created by gift from the husband, section 7 04(e) (1) permits the
department to reallocate the income if the donee's "share is determined
without allowance of reasonable compensation for services rendered to
the partnership by the donor" and if "the portion of such share attribut-
able to donated capital is proportionately greater than the share of the
donor attributable to the donor's capital." If the wife acquired her in-
terest by a bona fide purchase from her husband, the Treasury Regula-
tions imply that the tax department may not be allowed to make a
reallocation even though section 704(e) (3) expressly equates an interest
purchased from a family member as one created by gift from the seller.
However if the transfer has any of the substantial characteristics of a
gift, a reallocation could be made. 33
The procedure for making the reallocation is set forth by the Regu-
lations. The department first determines the reasonable allowance for
services rendered by the husband and for those by the wife, if any. This
determination would be made after consideration is given to all the
facts and circumstances of the business, including the fact that one of
the partners may have greater managerial responsibility than the other,
and the amount that would reasonably be paid to obtain comparable
services by a person not having an interest in the partnership. 34 Once
the allowance is determined and deducted, the balance is reallocated
between the donor and donee in accordance with the capital interest each
actually owns. 35 Therefore, it would seem that the department could
33 TREAs. REG. §1.704-1(e) (3) (ii) (b) (1956). "The alternative rules set forth
in Section 704(e) and subdivision (i) of this subparagraph apply in any case
in which the transfer or creation of the partnership interest has any of the
substantial characteristics of a gift. Thus allocation may be required where
transfer of a partnership interest is made between members of a family(including collaterals) under a purported purchase agreement, if the charac-
teristics of a gift are ascertained from the terms of the purchase agreement,
the terms of any loan or credit arrangement made to finance the purchase,
or from other relevant data."
34 TREAs. REG. §1.704-1 (e) (3) (i) (1956).
35 TREAS. REG. §1.704-1(e) (3) (i) (b) (1956).
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conclude that the donee has ownership over some capital but less than
that alleged.
The State of Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission in Fenske v.
Wisconsin Department of Taxation36 dealt with a typical husband and
wife partnership and decided aghinst its validity. Since the case involved
tax years from 1961-1964, the commission did riot consider the impact
of "federalization" and instead decided the case under pre-1965 Wiscon-
sin law. We will now consider an application of the federal tax require-
ments to the facts of that case.
Since the Fenskes' business consisted of the operation of a family
farm on which both performed services, it would easily qualify under
the Code's general definition of a partnership ;37 and farming would be
a business in which capital, consisting of land, livestock, and machinery,
is a material income-producing factor. Therefore, the basic question is
whether the wife actually owns her interest as a partner.
The facts that the taxpayers were still in the process of buying the
farm lands as joint tenants on a land contract, all proceeds from the
farm were deposited into a joint account on which both could draw,
and all liabilities were paid from this account, which presumably in-
cluded payments on the 1and contract, would present a strong argument
for the taxpayers that the wife was acquiring her capital interest from
a third party with her independent' funds.
This argument would depend on whether or not the checking account
constituted a true joint tenancy. The husband and wife would assert
that it did and that when payments were made from the account on the
land contract, the wife was thereby exercising her right over her share
of the income. She was therefore the actual owner of her capital interest.
The tax department's position could be that: (1) the joint account
was not a true joint tenancy, 38 i.e. the husband intended the wife to only
have a survivorship interest in the account and thus avoid probate ;39
(2) the wife did not have a right to withdraw from the account and
thus had no right of control over the income as deposited in the account;
(3) therefore, when payments were made on the land contract, no part
of the payments was attributable to the wife; (4) any interest the wife
acquired because of such payments was acquired by gift from the hus-
band; and (5) although the wife had a donated interest in the farm
lands, she was not a partner because the husband, having absolute con-
trol over the joint account, had similar control over the distribution of
the farm income and made no distribution.
36 BTA 1-2271, P. H. State and Local Taxes-Wis., par. 14,059 (1967).
3 Note 14, supra.
38 Zander v. Holly, 1 Wis.2d 300, 313 & 314, 84 N.W.2d 87, 95 (1957).
3 Gillett v. Wis. Department of Taxation, CH Wis. State Tax Rep., par. 200-
171 (1964).
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Whether the Fenskes' and the department would make the above
arguments, the fact that such positions could be equally well taken
indicates that the taxpayers have not sustained their burden of proof.
Considering no other facts but the facts of the joint checking account
in which the proceeds from the farm were deposited and from' which
payments were made on the land contract, it is impossible to determine:
(1) whether the wife's iriterest was acquired by purchase from a third
person with her independent funds or by gift from her husband; (2)
what rights the wife has in the joint account; or (3) whether any por-
tion of the deposited income was considered as distributed to the wife.
Although the burden of proof has not yet been met, other facts of the
case could still indicate that the taxpayers had a bona fide intent to
form a partnership.
In the Fenske case, the purchasing of machinery, the billing of farm
expenses, and the receipt of farm proceeds were all done solely in the
husband's own name. This indicates that, in relation to the public,
the husband conducted the business as its sole owner and not as a
partnership. Although it could be explained by contending that they had
formed a limited partnership, the facts of the case do not show that
a limited partnership agreement was made or, if made, that the partner-
ship was organized and conducted as required by state law, which is a
sine qua non for a limited partnership. 40
The commission found that the wife did not pay self-employment
Social Security taxes, which tends to indicate that the wife did not re-
gard herself as a partner.
Other facts indicate that the Fenskes' failed to comply with certain
formalities. No separate drawing accounts were provided for the hus-
band and wife in the farm business books. Keeping partnership books
and business records in the husband's name alone41 or having no rec-
ords at all4 2 weighs against the contention of a partnership. The tax-
payers also failed to execute a written agreement evidencing a partner-
ship. Although a writing is not required, lack of a written agreement
places a greater burden on the taxpayers to prove the existence of a
partnership agreement.
From the survey of the facts as presented in the case, 'it must be
concluded that under federal tax law requirements the taxpayers have
not sustained their burden of proving a bona fide intent to form a
partnership. Although the wife may own an interest in the farm lands
as a joint tenant, she does not own it as a partner.
From October of 1964 to the Fenske case in March of 1967, there
have been nine cases before the State of Wisconsin Tax Appeals Com-
10 TREAS. REG. §1.704-1(e) (2) (ix) (1956).
41 Kasper v. Baron, 207 F.2d 744, 748 (8th Cir. 1953).
42 Wright v. Celebrezze, 262 F. Supp. 615 (D.C. N.D. N.Y. 1965).
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mission which involved the validity of a family partnership; all but one
of these concerned farmers, and all but one involved a husband and
wife.43 The tax years covered ranged from 1956 to 1964. The great
similarity among these cases and the number of cases in a relatively
short period indicates a continuing problem among members of the
farm community concerning knowledge of the proper way to execute
a bona fide partnership in order to gain tax advantages. The best advice
that could be given to such persons would be to consult an attorney
before they attempt anything or at least before they file their tax returns.
As for the Fenskes', there are three general areas in which steps
should have been taken to insure their claim of a bona fide partnership.
The first relates to their joint bank account. As pointed out above,
one bank account, serving both family and business needs, creates an
ambigous situation which makes it impossible to determine whether,
and in what proportion, if any, the account represents partnership or
individually owned funds. Maintaining separate accounts for the part-
nership and for the individual members may be desirable in order to show
a bona fide intent to carry on the business as a partnership44 but may be
undesirable in that it could be too inconvenient. If one account is used,
the taxpayers should keep accurate and up-to-date records to indicate
the distributive share of partnership earnings allocable to the husband
and wife.
However since an actual distribution to the wife of the entire amount
or a major portion of her distributive share of the business income for
her sole benefit and use45 is substantial evidence of the reality of her
interest,46 and since a single account would not indicate what portion of
the account represented the wife's actual "distributed" share, as distin-
guished from her "distributive" 47 share, an individual bank account
for the wife into which her actual distributed share would be deposited
would seem mandatory. A separate account would also avoid the prob-
lems presented by Treasury Regulation 1.704-1(e) (2) (v):
43Gillett v. Wis. Department o Taxation, Note 39, supra; Harmsen v. Wis. De-
partment of Taxation, CCH Wis. State Tax Rep., par. 200-222 (1965); Harm-
sen v. Wis. Department of Taxation, CCH Wis. State Tax Rep., par. 200-
224 (1965) ; Buwalda v. Wis. Department of Taxation, CCH Wis. State Tax
Rep., par. 200-264 (1965); Mueller v. Wis. Department of Taxation, CCH
Wis. State Tax Rep., par 200-273 (1966) ; Grams v. Wis. Department of
Taxation, CCH Wis. State Tax Rep., par. 200-274 (1966) ; Nelson v. Wis.
Department of Taxation. CCH Wis. State Tax Rep., par. 200-278 (1966);
Mortenson v. Wis. Department of Taxation, CCH Wis. State Tax Rep., par.
200-268 (1966) ; Fenske v. Wis. Department of Taxation, P.H. State and
Local Taxes-Wis., par. 14,059 (1967).
44 Note 42, supra.
4 "[Slole benefit and use" would seem to indicate that the wife could not use
her share for necessary family expenditures for which the husband was
legally responsible.
46 TREAS. REG. §1.704-1(e) (2) (v) (1956).
4 7 INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, §702(a).
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* . . Amounts distributed are not considered to be used for the
donee's sole benefit if, for example, they are deposited, loaned,
or invested in such manner that the donor controls or can control
the use of enjoyment of such funds. (emphasis added)
The first problem would be interpreting the phrase "can control," and
the second would be whether the holding in Schley48 would have any
effect on the application of this section to a joint account. Therefore a
separate account for the wife not only avoids these problems but would
itself be an indicium that the wife acted as a partner, since she would
have sole control over hero distributed share of the income.49
The second general area in which the Fenskes' could have acted in
order to insure a holding that partnership status existed, concerns the
taxpayers' relationship to the public. In this regard they should have
at all times represented themselves as a partnership, especially to credi-
tors, customers, and lending institutions.
The final area relates to certain formalities which should have been
followed. A written agreement, evidencing the rights and liabilities of
the partners, and partnership records would be additional evidence of
a bona fide intent. Other important formalities with which the tax-
payers should have complied are set forth in Treasury Regulations sec-
tion 1.704-1 (e) (2) (vi) (1956).
Therefore, if the taxpayers had: (1) established a separate account
for the wife, (2) kept accurate and up-to-date partnership records, (3)
represented the business as a partnership to third parties, (4) executed a
written partnership agreement, and (5) complied with other formalities,
their allegation of a partnership, would have been sustained under fed-
eral tax law requirements.
Since the Regulations seem to have perpetuated the subjective re-
quirement of a bona fide intent as first introduced by the Culbertson
decision, the courts are still free to inquire into the intangible element
of a bona fide intent. However, it is difficult to imagine what more the
courts could consider other than the elements in the Regulations in de-
ciding the validity of a family partnership. Therefore, it would seem
that if the guidelines set forth in the Treasury Regulations are followed,
a husband and wife would be reasonably safe in forming a family part-
nership for the purpose of saving state income taxes.
RICHARD L. STILES
48 In re Estate of Schley, 271 Wis. 74, 72 N.W.2d 767 (1955) held that if a hus-
band and wife have created a true joint tenancy in a certificate of deposit
(similar to a checking account), each one has an absolute one half interest
in the account regardless of who deposits the money; and while one joint
tenant could withdraw the entrie amount, he would not destroy the one half
interest of the other if the latter could trace the one half interest.
49 Nicolas v. Davis, 204 F.2d 200, 201-202 (10th Cir. 1953) ; TREAs. REG. §1.704-
1(e) (2) (v) (1956).
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